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Introduction
The Clean Air Act includes a pair of programs that are together known as New Source
Review (NSR). These are the Part D NSR and Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs.
These programs require operators of new or modified large stationary sources to use advanced pollution-control technology. In addition, these sources must neither interfere with attaining national ambient air quality standards in "nonattainment" (dirty air) areas nor violate a set of increments designed to protect air quality from deterioration in "attainment" (clean air) areas.
While the applicability of NSR to new sources is relatively clear, controversy has arisen about which facility renovations constitute modifications. The Clean Air Act defines a "modification" as a physical or operational change that increases air pollution. In the late 1980s, EPA announced that a multifactor test, which includes consideration of the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and cost of the work, would be applied to determine whether a renovation constitutes a modification or "routine maintenance" (Wisconsin Electric Power v. Reilly 1990) .
In addition, the agency has maintained that an alteration increases air pollution if it would raise annual emissions, even if the source's maximum hourly emissions would not change.
In the late 1990s, EPA launched an enforcement initiative by filing legal action against some electricity-generating units (EGUs) that had renovated plant equipment, alleging that the renovations should have gone through the NSR permitting process (U. EGUs (EPA 2005a) . In this paper, we summarize the methods employed and the conclusions gleaned from these simulations and the related analysis.
We focused on EGUs, and in particular on coal-fired EGUs, for two reasons. First, coalfired EGUs are important contributors of these pollutants, accounting for approximately 70 and 20 percent of national SO 2 and NO x emissions in 2004, respectively (EPA 2005b) . Second, the shares of total capacity of large coal-fired EGUs that lack flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) The practical effect of both would be the same, since EGUs are very unlikely to trigger NSR under either method for determining the applicability of NSR. As a result, our analysis remains relevant until the fates of both ERP and the hourly emissions approach are decided.
Methods and Assumptions
Our modeling effort builds on the work done by EPA as part of its regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of ERP (EPA 2003) . Our analysis examines a wider range of potential influence on generation-investment decisionmaking of the prerevision NSR regulations (we define "prevision" regulations as those that the ERP revisions were intended to modify). In addition, we analyzed potential interactions of NSR with CAIR; the RIA did not consider CAIR because it
had not yet been proposed.
Description of IPM
For this modeling exercise, we used Version 2.1.9 of IPM, which was released in 2004 (EPA 2005a) . IPM, a deterministic model of the electricity sector, uses linear programming to find the least-cost pattern of EGU dispatch and generating-capacity investment and retirement to meet peak demands and regional reserve requirements. The least-cost approach is equivalent to the simulation of a perfectly competitive market in which all market participants have perfect information and demand is perfectly inelastic. Other simulation models, which are used to analyze the effect of regulatory changes on the power sector, have also adopted this approach (Energy Modeling Forum 2001).
IPM divides the continental U.S. electricity sector into 26 regions and allows for interregional power trading within the bounds of interregional transmission capacity, subject to transmission losses. Price-responsive fuel supplies are modeled using stepped supply curves for natural gas and coal. The model incorporates regulatory restrictions on emissions of air pollutants from EGUs. In the case of a cap-and-trade program such as CAIR, IPM finds the lowest-cost approach to comply with the program. 
Definition of Scenarios
The IPM scenarios are specified on three dimensions. One consists of different versions of EPA policy, which governs the breadth of the routine maintenance exemption from NSR along with varying assumptions about the exemption's effects on EGU decisions. A second dimension represents assumptions about whether CAIR and other recent air-pollution regulations will be in place. The third dimension consists of alternative scenarios about investment costs for renewable and advanced electricity-production technologies. The IPM runs are described in the following subsections and summarized in Table 1 .
Dimension 1: Strictness of NSR Policy
First, we simplified the NSR policies into two basic alternatives-the enforcement of the prerevision NSR multifactor approach and ERP (the "base case"). For the prerevision NSR rules, we defined two general variants: (1) "avoid," in which generators are generally able to avoid triggering NSR but at the cost of worsening performance (as assumed by EPA in its RIA for ERP [EPA 2002] ); and (2) "R/R/R," where a given quantity of coal-fired capacity must either retrofit pollution controls, repower with NSR-compliant generation technology, or retire. Economic, policy, and legal uncertainties are too great to determine which variant is most likely to be correct, so we adopted this scenario approach to explore and bound the consequences of alternative assumptions.
We used the EPA RIA results to represent the avoid variant of the prerevision rules. This variant anticipates that prerevision NSR would cause generator owners to avoid undergoing NSR by deferring maintenance. The assumed consequence of this anticipated behavior is a steady 0.1 percent per year deterioration in efficiency and capacity. This deterioration yielded higher generation costs but essentially the same temporal pattern of NO x and SO 2 emissions as the ERP scenario. Emissions caps would therefore determine the total emissions in the avoid variant.
Consequently, if the prerevision NSR rule results in all generators avoiding NSR, the national NO x and SO 2 emissions differences between the prerevision rule and the proposed ERP would be minor.
The R/R/R variant posits that enforcement of the prerevision NSR rules would cause some capacity without FGD or SCR to install these controls or retire. Subvariants assume different lower bounds on the amount of capacity (defined as a fraction of 2004 capacity) that must retrofit, repower, or retire in each year. These restrictions become increasingly expensive to achieve as the share of capacity yet to comply with the R/R/R requirement diminishes over time.
The low R/R/R variant assumes that capacity equivalent to 2 percent of the 188.5 gigawatts The rate of retrofit adoption suggested by the high variant is unlikely because some fraction of uncontrolled generation is probable (to avoid NSR by deferring maintenance). Nevertheless, we did analyze the high scenario, treating it as a bounding case.
Some might even find the rate of NSR applicability under the lower R/R/R scenarios implausibly high. EPA has recently been paying attention to alleged violators, though, which may influence EGU owners to conclude more often that NSR is applicable to a particular maintenance project. Expectations about the probability of enforcement have likely risen, as well as expectations of the size of the penalties that sources may face for noncompliance. (Violations at a single plant have led to penalties requiring pollution control retrofits at numerous other plants.) Keohane et al. (2006) show that plants responded to the possibility of being subject to enforcement action by lowering their 1999 SO 2 emissions rates to avoid regulatory scrutiny.
Admittedly, this effect may be ephemeral. In the long run, sources may simply avoid the types of investments that attracted EPA's attention. If this hypothesis holds true, net NSR-induced retrofits may not increase at all. Bushnell and Wolfram (2006) present evidence supporting this hypothesis, noting that plants in states with tighter regulations and those more likely to be subject to NSR have avoided making large maintenance investments. These investigators, however, find that reduced capital investment has not had a negative impact on the fuel efficiency of these plants.
The three R/R/R scenarios of EPA's prerevision NSR approach represent different assumptions about the pace and effectiveness of enforcement. When estimating the costs of implementing the specified fraction of R/R/R, IPM yields an estimated lower bound on cost because the model chooses the lowest-cost method of meeting the constraint. As we noted previously, EPA may not choose EGUs for enforcement actions in this way, so actual costs of complying with NSR might be higher. Another important assumption concerns the number of allowances that are surrendered as part of enforcement actions. In several NSR settlements, electric generators have surrendered allowances as a penalty for noncompliance. Our R/R/R scenarios assume no further allowance surrenders. Additional surrenders might be possible under the prerevision NSR rule; however, because it is uncertain how many may occur, we did not model them.
In contrast to these prerevision scenarios, ERP is assumed to be embodied in the EPA IPM base cases (EPA 2005e). Essentially, the assumption is that ERP has such a negligible or unidentifiable effect that the IPM ignores the incentives it generates. The ERP base-case runs are compared to the R/R/R runs to assess possible emissions, cost, and technology effects of ERP under the assumption that retaining the prerevision NSR approach would force a substantial amount of coal capacity without FGD to face the R/R/R decision. We did not compare the base cases to the avoid variants because the IPM runs from the 2002 ERP RIA are based on an earlier set of economic and technological assumptions (EPA 2002).
Dimension 2: CAIR and Other Regulations
To consider how the R/R/R characterizations of NSR may interact with different caps on NO x and SO 2 emissions, we identified two alternative regulatory backdrops. Under one alternative, the "without-CAIR" case, the only federal regulations in place are the 1990 Title IV In the second sensitivity analysis, we took the annual national NO x and SO 2 emissions results achieved in the high R/R/R scenario and calculated the lowest-cost means of achieving the associated emissions reductions in each simulation year. This approach, which simulates using a policy of caps with allowance banking to achieve the same national emissions levels, indicates how cost-effective the prerevision NSR might be for accomplishing incremental reductions in national emissions (compared to a policy of tightening emissions caps further).
Results

Emissions-Reduction Strategies
We first review the differences in generation and investment patterns among the solutions. The IPM runs show that coal-fired EGUs nearly always respond to an assumed mandate to retrofit, repower, or retire by retrofitting emissions controls. Imposition of even the high (7.5 percent) R/R/R scenario results in less than 2 percent of the uncontrolled capacity repowering or retiring. Further, a comparison across the different scenarios shows relatively little difference in the national share of coal-fired generation. Coal-fired EGUs, however, use coals with different sulfur content in response to the varying strictness of the R/R/R scenarios.
Essentially we are assuming that once a source undergoes NSR, it is under no obligation to also use coal with lower sulfur content or whatever coal type it was using before retrofitting. in each scenario. But with CAIR, the R/R/R constraints bind (i.e., actually increase FGD capacity relative to the base-case ERP) only in the later years, and then only in the middle and high R/R/R scenarios. In earlier years, and for all years with the low R/R/R scenario, high allowance prices under the tight CAIR emissions caps motivate more retrofits than the R/R/R constraints require.
Temporal Distributions
The temporal pattern of emissions of each prerevision R/R/R scenario differs between SO 2 and NO x . Figures 2 and 3 present the total U.S. emissions levels in tons for those scenarios, as well as for the base case (which we interpret as representing implementation of either ERP or the hourly emissions test proposed by EPA). For reference, the figures also show the historical SO 2 and NO x emissions by U.S. EGUs.
All R/R/R scenarios yield some emissions decreases compared to ERP, assuming that only Title IV and the NO x SIP Call caps are in place (Figure 2 ). In the most extreme case (the high R/R/R scenario), NO x emissions in 2020 are 54 percent of the emissions in the base case, because there is no broad cap-and-trade program for reducing national NO x emissions. The temporal emissions pattern for SO 2 shows some changes for the middle R/R/R scenario, but the anticipated 2 percent emissions decrease in 2010 is more than matched by a predicted increase of 10 percent in 2007, with only negligible changes in total emissions from 2007 to 2020. However, if we expect that damages realized in the near future are valued more than those incurred in the distant future, and that marginal damages increase with emissions, this temporal shift in emissions likely raises realized damages (although we ignore the effect of any spatial changes in emissions). Only the high R/R/R scenario causes SO 2 emissions to fall significantly below Title IV allocations, and then only in 2020. By that year, nearly all coal capacity has FGD, and SO 2 emissions fall to 41 percent of the base-case 2020 levels. If CAIR is not implemented, then, prerevision NSR rules could significantly affect national emissions compared to the ERP or the proposed hourly emissions approach.
We turn now to solutions that assume the implementation of the tighter caps for SO 2 and NO x under CAIR (Figure 3) . The low and middle R/R/R scenarios indicate that, except for NO x in the year 2020, the prerevision NSR rules would not pull national emissions below the CAIR caps. NO x from CAIR-affected sources falls 10 percent below the cap in 2020 in the middle R/R/R case. The total decrease in NO x relative to the CAIR ERP base case, though, is considerably smaller than if only Title IV and the NO x SIP Call were in place (Figure 2 ). The different temporal patterns of national NO x and SO 2 emissions are partly the result of the greater flexibility that generators have to alter SO 2 emissions. These emissions can be adjusted by switching to coal with a different sulfur content as well as by installing postcombustion controls and changing generation dispatch so that cleaner facilities are operated more often. Once FGD is installed, a coal-fired generator that previously burned low-sulfur coal may switch to less-expensive, higher-sulfur coal to keep its costs down, thereby diminishing the ultimate effect of the retrofit on total emissions of SO 2 from the facility. In contrast, options for reducing NO x emissions are typically limited to pollution-control retrofitting or curtailment of operations.
Spatial Distributions
Because CAIR affects only eastern and midwestern states, we might expect that R/R/R constraints would affect emissions from sources within the CAIR region differently than sources elsewhere, relative to the ERP base case. We focus on the high R/R/R scenario because it is the only R/R/R case that yields noticeably different annual national emissions compared to ERP. The In contrast, the existing share of non-CAIR-affected capacity that has FGD is already high under the ERP case, assuming CAIR is implemented. In part this is because, although these plants are outside the CAIR region, they are still part of the Title IV SO 2 cap-and-trade program.
The share of non-CAIR sources with FGD is 59, 63, and 85 percent in 2007, 2010, and 2015, respectively, under both the ERP and high R/R/R scenarios. A noticeable difference is seen only in 2020, when 88 percent of the non-CAIR capacity has FGD under the ERP and 96 percent has FGD under the high R/R/R scenario. This difference is slight, however, relative to CAIRaffected coal-fired EGUs, where 64 percent have FGD in 2020 with ERP while 93 percent have FGD with the high R/R/R scenario. The benefit of installing FGD in the CAIR region when forced by the high R/R/R scenario is that sources can use less-expensive high-sulfur coal. EGUs thus benefit financially from installing controls in the CAIR region as long as the SO 2 cap remains binding and allowances have value.
Sensitivity Analyses of New-Generation Technology Costs
As described earlier, we ran the high R/R/R scenario under CAIR using assumptions of lower investment costs for renewables and IGCC. The results show almost no difference in emissions, the generation mix, and emissions controls through 2020. Renewable generation capacity goes up by about 15 percent in 2020 compared to the original high R/R/R analysis.
However, because this increase is from a small base (14 GW, less than 5 percent of the amount of coal capacity), it has a negligible effect on emissions. Similarly, even though new IGCC capacity more than doubles compared to the original high R/R/R analysis (to 12.2 GW by 2020), this is only 3 percent of total coal capacity.
Efficiency of Different Regulatory Techniques for Reducing Emissions
Comparing the high R/R/R scenarios with and without CAIR provides one indication of the effectiveness of economic incentives to lower SO 2 and NO x emissions by taking advantage of all abatement strategies. Those two solutions have similar amounts of FGD retrofits in every year Second, CAIR's tighter restrictions motivate fuel-switching and emissions-dispatch strategies for reducing emissions at generating units that are not retrofitted with controls. In contrast, strategies such as the emissions-control retrofits required by NSR provide no incentives to adopt such operating strategies for reducing emissions.
We now consider the cost-effectiveness in dollars per ton for each R/R/R case against the ERP base case for both the Title IV/NO x SIP Call and the CAIR scenarios. In this context, we define "cost-effectiveness" as the increase in the present value of the total cost of electricity production divided by the reduction in emissions. For simplicity, NO x and SO 2 reductions are weighted equally. Costs and emissions from 2007 through 2020 are considered; values for years between the simulation years (2007, 2010, 2015, and 2020) are obtained by linear interpolation.
We calculate two cost-effectiveness measures for each R/R/R case: one based on discounting emissions reductions and the other considering a simple sum of reductions over those years.
Discounting emissions reductions is equivalent to calculating a levelized cost per ton of emissions reductions, and, in essence, treats the benefits of emissions reductions as equivalent to the costs of achieving these reductions in the future. We assume a 5 percent per year discount rate.
The runs show that when the NSR R/R/R constraint yields emissions reductions compared to the ERP without CAIR, their cost is between $850 and $5,900 per ton (1999$).
With the CAIR emissions constraints, the incremental cost of any further emissions reductions associated with the prerevision rule would be between $2,900 and $53,000 per ton. When emissions (undiscounted or discounted) increase under the R/R/R scenarios (e.g., the high R/R/R scenario with CAIR), the cost-effectiveness is necessarily negative-both emissions and costs are higher. The cost per ton of reductions is highest in the scenarios where emissions are reduced only slightly (i.e., the middle R/R/R scenarios). For example, relative to the CAIR base case, the discounted total emissions reductions from the middle R/R/R scenario are 18,000 tons (+340,000 tons of SO 2 and -358,000 tons of NO x ; undiscounted figures are +383,000 and -707,000 tons) and the additional cost is $950 million, yielding an average reduction cost of $53,000 per ton. In contrast, under the high R/R/R case, the discounted reduction is about 700,000 tons (+789,000 tons of SO 2 and -1,480,000 tons of NO x ; undiscounted figures are +239,000 and -2,765,000 tons) with an incremental cost of $9.2 billion for an average reduction cost of $13,000 per ton.
We would not expect such a fluctuating pattern of cost-effectiveness, with average emissions-reduction costs rising and then falling as emissions decline, if we were instead tightening a national emissions cap. As an emissions cap is tightened, we would expect the average cost of emissions reductions to always rise. As we have modeled it, however, the R/R/R program does not target emissions, but rather the amount of capacity that is retrofitted or retired.
With such a policy, there is no assurance that the boilers that are cheapest to retrofit with pollution controls are necessarily those that achieve the most cost-effective emissions reductions. Further, as we described previously, once emissions caps are binding in an intertemporal sense, forcing additional SCR and FGD retrofits results in substitution away from other abatement techniques such as fuel switching. This incongruence between the incentives of the NSR policy and the goal of reducing emissions in the presence of emissions caps is most pronounced in the middle R/R/R scenarios.
These costs per ton of reduction are large compared with the costs of achieving emissions reductions by using a cap alone. A first indication of this is the cost of the CAIR-induced reductions relative to the Title IV/NO x SIP Call under the ERP, which is $470 per ton (undiscounted) to $730 per ton (discounted). CAIR's incremental cost per ton is smaller by an order of magnitude or more than the incremental cost of emissions reduction achieved by the NSR R/R/R scenarios we reported on earlier. A more relevant comparison would be the potential for cost savings if, rather than achieving further emissions reductions via prerevision NSR, they are achieved via tighter national caps on emissions. To make this comparison, we conducted a sensitivity analysis where the IPM was run without R/R/R limits but with constraints forcing national SO 2 and NO x emissions in each of the solution years to be no more than the levels achieved in the with-CAIR high R/R/R scenario.
We found that the additional pollution-control costs under the hypothetical national emissions caps were less than the costs under the high R/R/R scenario. The cost-effectiveness of the incremental emissions reductions achieved by these national caps beyond the CAIR ERP base case is $960 per ton (undiscounted) and $2,600 per ton (discounted). Those costs are onethird and one-fifth, respectively, of the cost of the same emissions reductions obtained by relying on the prerevision NSR rule, assuming the high R/R/R scenario ($3,100 and $13,000, respectively). This shows that the prerevision NSR rule is not a cost-effective way to achieve national emissions reductions. Using emissions caps to obtain the reductions achieved by the high R/R/R scenario results in fewer FGD and SCR retrofits (30 percent fewer in 2020); more consumption of western low-sulfur coal (14 percent more in 2020) and natural gas; and more selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) controls. (SNCR is a postcombustion control technology for NO x that costs less than SCR but reduces emissions by about a third as much.)
The prevision NSR approach gives sources less flexibility by interfering with emissions trading.
Sources are thus deprived of the opportunity to arrive at lowest-cost solutions (see NRC 2004) so that it becomes more expensive to achieve the same national emissions reductions.
Conclusions
We caution that economic and legal uncertainties are too great to determine precisely how generator decisions to retrofit, repower, or retire are affected under the prerevision NSR rules or under the 2003 ERP proposal (or its functional equivalent, the hourly emissions averaging proposal). Given these uncertainties, we have adopted a scenario approach to explore and provide bounds on the likely consequences of different potential stringencies of NSR applicability. We show that sectoral simulation models such as IPM can be helpful for projecting industry-wide responses to the ERP and analyzing its effects on national emissions; however, such models are insufficiently detailed to assess effects on local emissions or air quality.
The EPA RIA (2004) assumed that, under the prerevision NSR rules, generation owners would choose to avoid NSR by deferring maintenance. We examined a broader array of scenarios concerning the possible reaction of the power industry to the prerevision NSR rules.
Depending on the stringency of emissions caps, our analysis shows that changing assumptions about industry response can alter the conclusions reached by comparing the prerevision NSR rules with ERP. Also, the potential effects of adopting ERP on national power sector emissions differ between SO 2 and NO x and depend on whether CAIR is in place.
Unless controls become extensive enough to reduce emissions for both NO x and SO 2 below their respective caps, the main effects of a prerevision NSR policy-which would force more facility retrofits or retirements-would be to increase power costs and spatially redistribute emissions. With the caps binding, emissions reductions associated with NSR at one facility free up allowances that permit emissions elsewhere to increase. Health effects could plausibly increase or decrease, depending on where and when emissions changes occur.
In contrast, if a prerevision NSR policy would change generator decisions sufficiently to pull emissions below the caps, the prerevision rules would yield lower emissions than ERP. But the cost of such incremental reductions with prerevision NSR is several times as high as the cost of achieving the same reductions by tighter cap-and-trade policies. We note, though, that NSR has additional goals, such as preventing local increases in air pollution, and that the IPM does not address those other goals. Sensitivity analysis exploring cost savings from using cap-and-trade programs to achieve emissions realized in high R/R/R scenario. Analyzed only with the CAIR, CAMR, and CAVR policy setting
